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I. INTRODUCTION  
The Ninth Circuit panel in this case reversed the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in Amazon’s1 favor, properly finding disputed issues of 
material fact as to whether Amazon’s results page – which displays the MTM 
trademark numerous times at the top of the page, followed by a display of 
competitors’ watches, without informing the consumer that the “results” displayed 
differ from the MTM products requested – creates a likelihood of confusion.   
While Amazon predictably disagrees with this ruling,2 mere disagreement 
with a Court’s ruling is not sufficient to warrant en banc review.  Rather, en banc 
review is a disfavored procedure, only available when necessary to address 
irreconcilable conflicts between the Court’s decisions or where the proceeding 
involves a question of exceptional national importance.  Neither ground for en 
banc review exists here, and Amazon’s petition for review should be denied for the 
following reasons:  
First, in the very introduction to its opinion, the Court makes clear that it 
views likelihood of confusion from the perspective of a “frequent Amazon 
                                                 
1 Appellant Multi Time Machine, Inc. is referred to herein as “MTM.”  
Respondents Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon Services, LLC are collectively 
referred to as “Amazon.”   
2 A proposed Amicus brief has also been submitted on behalf of Google, 
EBay, Yahoo!, Pinterest and Twitter, who, like Amazon, are large internet 
companies with a clear interest in expanding protection from liability for trademark 
infringement, as would result from a reversal of the Court’s opinion in this action.   
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shopper,” not of an inexperienced internet consumer as Amazon erroneously 
claims.  As such, the Court here certainly did not reject the “reasonably prudent 
consumer standard,” as Amazon falsely claims, but rather applied that standard.  
Therefore, en banc review is not necessary to correct this alleged error, which did 
not occur.  
Second, there is no conflict, irreconcilable or otherwise, between the Court’s 
decision in this case and Network Automation v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., 
638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011).  To the contrary, Network Automation reversed the 
District Court’s preliminary injunction, based in large part on the fact that the 
advertisements displayed as a result of the use of the ActiveBatch trademark as a 
search term were displayed in a separately labeled section of the screen identified 
as “Sponsored Links.’”  Labeling these advertisements as “Sponsored Links” is the 
equivalent to Amazon displaying a disclaimer or otherwise communicating that it 
does not offer MTM  watches for sale.  Thus, in ruling that there were material 
issues of fact regarding whether a likelihood of confusion arose from Amazon’s 
results screen in the absence of such a disclaimer, the Court’s decision in this case 
is entirely consistent with Network Automation.   
Neither did the Court’s ruling in this case diverge from Network Automation 
in its handling of the initial interest confusion doctrine.  Network Automation did 
not overrule the initial interest confusion doctrine, but rather cautioned against it 
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being overextended to cases in which there was no likelihood of confusion, but 
only mere diversion.  The Court’s opinion in this case follows Network Automation 
by making clear that to prevail at trial, MTM must establish a likelihood of 
confusion and not just mere diversion and that this is a question of fact to be 
determined by the jury.    
Finally, there is no need for en banc review of the Court’s holding that “the 
customer-generated use of a trademark in the retail search context is a use in 
commerce.”  Amazon has waived this argument by failing to address it in its brief 
or during oral argument, and should not be permitted to raise this issue for the first 
time in connection with its petition for en banc review.  In any event, the Court’s 
holding on this issue follows the holding of Network Automation that the use of a 
trademark as a search engine keyword that triggers the display of a competitor’s 
advertisement is a “use in commerce” under the Lanham Act.  The Court’s 
holding, which is both correct and consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent, need 
not and should not be reviewed en banc.   
II. ARGUMENT 
Parties can – and in this case Amazon, not surprisingly, does – disagree with 
the Court’s decision on this appeal.  But it is fundamental that disagreement with a 
Court’s decision does not warrant en banc review.  To the contrary, “[a]n en banc 
hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en 
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banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's 
decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.”  
Fed.R.App.Proc. 35(a) (Emphasis added.)   
“The principal purpose of en banc review is to establish 
uniformity within the circuit among all the panels. Id. 
Such a review is an ‘extraordinary procedure intended to 
bring to the attention of the entire court an issue of 
exceptional public importance or a panel decision that 
allegedly conflicts with precedent of the Supreme Court 
or the circuit.’ 2A Fed.Proc.L.Ed. § 3:847. An en banc 
review will resolve an intra-circuit conflict between two 
panels. Id. This leads to certainty in the application of the 
law, which is the desired outcome of stare decisis.” 
In re Barakat, 173 B.R. 672, 677 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) subsequently aff'd, 99 
F.3d 1520 (9th Cir. 1996).   
En banc review is the appropriate mechanism to resolve an irreconcilable 
conflict between two circuit precedents.  See United States v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d 
1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992) (“In Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 
(9th Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 989, 108 S.Ct. 1293, 99 L.Ed.2d 
503 (1988), we held that ‘the appropriate mechanism for resolving an 
irreconcilable conflict is an en banc decision.’”)   
Here, contrary to Amazon’s contention, there is no conflict, irreconcilable or 
otherwise, between the Court’s ruling on this appeal and prior Ninth Circuit 
precedent.  And, while this case, like many in the Ninth Circuit, is certainly 
important, it is not of such “exceptional public importance” as to justify en banc 
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review.  See Cal. Prac. Guide Fed. 9th Cir. Civ. App. Prac. Ch. 11-B (“Hundreds of 
important cases are filed each year in the Ninth Circuit.  These include cases 
involving the constitutionality of state and federal laws, million dollar claims and 
the interpretation of critical federal statutes.  The court rarely grants en banc 
review based solely on the ‘exceptional importance’ of a case.”)   
As fully discussed below, the Court’s decision neither conflicts with Ninth 
Circuit precedent nor involves question of such exceptional importance as to 
warrant en banc review.  As such, the petition for rehearing should be denied.   
A. The Court’s Decision Properly Views the Likelihood of Confusion 
From the Perspective of a “Frequent Amazon Shopper” and Does 
Not Reject the “Reasonably Prudent Consumer Standard” As 
Amazon Erroneously Claims 
Amazon erroneously claims that the Court rejected the “reasonably prudent 
consumer” standard in evaluating whether there were triable issues of material fact 
regarding a likelihood of confusion.  In making this claim, Amazon risks 
misleading the Court.  In the second paragraph of its opinion, the Court envisions  
a customer searching for MTM watches on the Amazon website.  Notably, the 
customer envisioned by the Court is “a frequent Amazon shopper,” not an 
unsophisticated customer unaccustomed to the internet:   
If her brother mentioned MTM Special Ops watches, a 
frequent Amazon shopper might try to purchase one for 
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him through Amazon.  If she were to enter “MTM 
Special Ops” as her search request on the Amazon 
website, Amazon would respond with its page showing 
MTM Special Ops (1) in the search field (2) “MTM 
Specials Ops” again—in quotation marks—immediately 
below the search field and (3) yet again in the phrase 
“Related Searches: MTM special ops watch,” all before 
stating “Showing 10 Results.” 
Multi Time Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. (“Opinion”), at 3.3  (Emphasis 
added.)   
The Court did not “reject the reasonably prudent consumer standard,” as 
Amazon claims.  Instead, the Court noted – correctly – that “[o]n summary 
judgment, the court may not make assumptions about the sophistication of would-
be purchasers.”  Opinion at 17, citing Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret 
Stores Brand Management, Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010).  See also 
Fortune Dynamic, supra at 1038 (“Whoever’s right, the difficulty of trying to 
determine with any degree of confidence the level of sophistication of young 
women shopping at Victoria’s Secret only confirms the need for this case to be 
heard by a jury.”)  The Court then offered examples of the different types of 
consumers who might be interested in purchasing MTM watches, explaining:  
Some members of MTM’s target demographic, men of 
22–55 years of age who like military-styled, rugged 
products, may not be frequent internet shoppers.  Such 
purchasers “may incorrectly believe that [defendant] 
                                                 
3 The Panel’s Opinion is attached as an Addendum to Amazon’s Petition for 
Rehearing En Banc.  
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licensed [the mark] from [plaintiff] . . . . Other consumers 
may simply believe that [defendant or the manufacturers 
it features] bought out [plaintiff], or that they are related 
companies.”  Brookfield Commc’n, Inc. v. West Coast 
Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999).  This 
is especially possible here because Amazon touts itself as 
offering “Earth’s Biggest Selection of products,” and, as 
noted above, manufacturers sometimes market luxury 
brands under distinct marks.  
Opinion, at 17. 
Amazon seizes on this language, out of context, as support for its false 
assertion that the Court rejected the “reasonably prudent consumer” standard.  But 
this description of the various types of customers who might be interested in MTM 
watches is just that – a description of the various types of MTM customers – and 
does not support Amazon’s conclusion that the majority viewed the search results 
from the perspective of an inexperienced internet consumer.4   
Rather, the opposite is true, given the Court’s description of the “frequent 
Amazon shopper” conducting a search for such products.  And there is no support 
whatsoever in the majority decision for Amazon’s claim that the Court rejected the 
reasonably prudent consumer standard.  The Court did not reject that standard, but 
rather applied it.  Therefore, there is no inconsistency between the Court’s opinion 
                                                 
4 This language is contained in the part of the Opinion in which the Court 
discusses the similarity of goods, one of the Sleekcraft factors.  Notably, Amazon 
does not take issue with the Court’s Sleekcraft analysis, which supports its 
conclusion that there were triable issues of material fact regarding the likelihood of 
confusion, rendering summary judgment inappropriate.   
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in this case and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 
2010), and no departure from Ninth Circuit precedent justifying en banc review of 
the Court’s decision.  
B. The Court’s Decision Follows Network Automation and Other 
Applicable Ninth Circuit Precedent 
1. The Court’s Decision Follows Prior Ninth Circuit Precedent 
With Respect to the Absence of Clear Labeling of Amazon’s 
Results Page 
The Court’s decision in this case does not depart from – but rather follows – 
Network Automation and other relevant Ninth Circuit precedent, in ruling that 
triable issues of fact exist as to whether there is a likelihood of confusion, absent 
clear labeling advising the potential customer that the products presented in the 
search results differ from the MTM product for which the customer searched.  In 
arguing otherwise, Amazon ignores a key fact underlying the Network Automation 
ruling: namely that advertisements displayed after a customer entered a search in a 
search engine using the ActiveBatch trademark were contained in a separately 
labeled section of the results screen identified as “Sponsored Links.”  Making clear 
that the fact that the advertisements were labeled as Sponsored Links was key to its 
decision overturning the District Court’s injunction, the Network Automation Court 
explained:  
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In Playboy Enterprises, we found it important that the 
consumers saw banner advertisements that were 
‘confusingly labeled or not labeled at all.’ 354 F.3d at 
1023.  We noted that clear labeling ‘might eliminate the 
likelihood of initial interest confusion that exists in this 
case.’  Id. at 1030 n.43.  The appearance of the 
advertisements and their surrounding context on the 
user’s screen are similarly important here.  The district 
court correctly examined the text of Network’s sponsored 
links, concluding that the advertisements did not clearly 
identify their source.  However, the district court did not 
consider the surrounding context.  In Playboy 
Enterprises, we also found it important that Netscape’s 
search engine did not clearly segregate the sponsored 
advertisements from the objective results.  354 F.3d at 
1030.  Here, even if Network has not clearly identified 
itself in the text of its ads, Google and Bing have 
partitioned their search results pages so that the 
advertisements appear in separately labeled sections for 
“sponsored” links.  The labeling and appearance of the 
advertisements as they appear on the results page 
includes more than the text of the advertisement, and 
must be considered as a whole. 
Network Automation, supra, at 1154.  (Emphasis added.) 
Following Network Automation, the Court here took into account that when 
a user searched for MTM watches, which are not offered for sale on the Amazon 
website, Amazon’s results page did not clearly label the products offered in 
response to the search as alternative products, as other internet retailers do, stating:  
“ Nothing on either of the pages states that Amazon does 
not carry MTM products.  Not so the websites of 
Amazon’s competitors Buy.com and Overstock.com.  
They clearly announce that no search results match the 
“MTM Special Ops” query and those websites do not 
route the visitor to a page with both MTM’s trademark 
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“MTM Specials Ops” repeatedly at the top and 
competitors’ watches below.  
Opinion, at 6.5   
While Amazon’s results page identifies the brands of the products offered in 
place of the MTM watches for which the consumer searched, the majority ruling 
properly found, consistent with Network Automation, that this on its own was 
insufficient to support summary judgment in Amazon’s favor.  Rather, the majority 
properly found that in the absence of a disclaimer or other communication to the 
consumer that the products displayed were being offered as an alternative to the 
product searched, the question of whether the results page was sufficiently clearly 
labeled was a factual question to be decided by the jury:  
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the  
product details for competitors’ itemized products were 
clearly labeled, but we find that the clarity of the search 
results page at issue is open to dispute. We must not 
                                                 
5 Similarly, in Tabari, supra, the Court noted that by the time of trial, the 
website at issue included a prominent disclaimer, which “stated, prominently and 
in large font, ‘We are not an authorized Lexus dealer or affiliated in any way with 
Lexus. We are an Independent Auto Broker.’”  Tabari, supra at 1181.  In 
concluding that the there was no risk of confusion as to ownership and that the 
Tabaris had established their fair use defense, the Tabari Court explained:  
“Reasonable consumers would arrive at the Tabaris’ site agnostic as to what they 
would find.  Once there, they would immediately see the disclaimer and would 
promptly be disabused of any notion that the Tabaris’ website is sponsored by 
Toyota.  Because there was no risk of confusion as to sponsorship or endorsement, 
the Tabaris’ use of the Lexus mark was fair.”  Id.  Consistent with Tabari, the 
Court in this case concluded that absent a similar disclaimer, there was a question 
of fact regarding likelihood of confusion precluding summary judgment.    
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substitute our determination of what constitutes clear 
labeling, nor its importance, for that of a jury. 
Opinion, at 13. 
In finding that there was insufficient labeling to support summary judgment, 
the Court’s ruling thus followed Network Automation and Playboy Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004), which 
preceded it.  Amazon’s results screen contains no labeling advising the customer 
that alternative products are being offered in place of the specific product being 
searched for.  Displaying its search results without such labeling is analogous to 
the unlabeled banner advertisements at issue in Playboy Enterprises.  Amazon’s 
unlabeled results page is also inapposite to the page at issue in Network 
Automation in which the section of the screen containing the link to Netscape 
products was labeled as “Sponsored Links,” to alert the consumer to the fact that 
the products in that section of the screen may not be the Active Batch products for 
which the consumer searched.  Thus, the Court’s ruling in this case follows the 
Ninth Circuit’s precedent in Playboy Enterprises and Network Automation.  As 
such, there is no conflict, let alone an irreconcilable conflict, between the ruling in 
this case and prior Ninth Circuit precedent, justifying en banc review.  
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2. The Court Properly Applied the Initial Interest Confusion 
Doctrine, as Limited by Network Automation  
The panel also properly applied the doctrine of initial interest confusion, as 
limited by Network Automation, to the facts of this case.  While initial interest 
confusion was first articulated in Brookfield Communications v. West Coast 
Entertainment Corporation, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999), that doctrine was later 
refined and limited by Network Automation.  Citing Playboy Enterprises, and, in 
particular, Judge Berzon’s concurring opinion cautioning against an overextension 
of the initial interest confusion doctrine to encompass cases where there is no 
likely confusion, the Network Automation Court explained that “because the sine 
qua non of trademark infringement is consumer confusion, when we examine 
initial interest confusion, the owner of the mark must demonstrate likely confusion, 
not mere diversion.”  Network Automation, supra, at 1149.   
Consistent with Network Automation, the majority opinion here explained 
that “initial interest confusion still constitutes trademark infringement because it 
‘impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark and is therefore 
actionable trademark infringement.’”  Opinion, at 9.  But, consistent with Network 
Automation, the majority opinion also makes clear that infringement cannot be 
found based solely on diversion, absent any likely confusion.  Rather, the majority 
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opinion reversed summary judgment in Amazon’s favor, because “whether 
customers are merely diverted is a question of fact.”  Opinion, at 10, fn. 5.   
Thus, the majority opinion follows Network Automation and other Ninth 
Circuit precedent in making clear that initial interest confusion can support 
trademark infringement, but only if there is a likelihood of confusion and not mere 
diversion.  The majority opinion further properly held that whether customers are 
“merely diverted” is a question of fact, not susceptible to summary judgment.  
Thus, the majority’s ruling is entirely consistent with Network Automation, and the 
likelihood of confusion issue, which is a question of fact, is not susceptible to 
summary judgment.   
C. There is No Basis for En Banc Review of The Court’s Holding 
that the Customer-Generated Use of a Trademark in the Retail 
Search Context Constitutes “Use in Commerce” 
The District Court correctly noted that “the Ninth Circuit has held that the 
use of a trademark as a search engine keyword that triggers the display of a 
competitor’s advertisement is a ‘use in commerce’ under the Lanham Act.”  ER 10, 
citing Network Automation, supra, at 1144-45.  The District Court further noted 
that “because Amazon’s use [of the MTM trademarks] is in connection with the 
sale of goods, it appears likely to be a ‘use in commerce’ both in the jurisdictional 
sense and with respect to the statutory meaning.” ER 10, citing Network 
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Automation, supra, at 1144-45.  Although this portion of the District Court’s ruling 
was neither appealed by Amazon nor addressed by Amazon in its briefing, the 
majority correctly agreed with the District Court, holding “that the customer-
generated use of a trademark in the retail search context is a use in commerce.”  
Opinion, at 21.  
There is no basis for en banc rehearing of this issue.   
First, Amazon has waived this issue by failing to address it in its brief or in 
oral argument. See Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1535 (9th Cir. 1992), as 
supplemented on denial of reh'g (Mar. 11, 1992) (“Ordinarily, arguments not 
timely presented are deemed waived. . . .  This general doctrine of waiver applies 
to arguments raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing.” (internal citations 
omitted.))  See also United States v. Lewis, 798 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1986) (“In its 
petition for rehearing, the government claims for the first time that Lewis waived 
the severance issue by failing to renew his motion to sever at the close of the 
evidence.  Because the government failed to raise this question in its brief or at oral 
argument, we decline to address it.”).  As a result, Amazon should not be permitted 
to raise this issue for the first time in its Petition for en banc review.  
Second, the majority’s holding, that “the customer-generated use of a 
trademark in the retail search context is a use in commerce,” which is in agreement 
with the view of the District Court, is both correct and a natural extension of the 
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holding of Network Automation that the use of a trademark as a search engine 
keyword that triggers the display of a competitor’s advertisement is a ‘use in 
commerce’ under the Lanham Act.  Network Automation, supra, at 1144-45.  
There is no inconsistency on this issue within the Ninth Circuit, and no need for en 
banc review of this issue.  
III. CONCLUSION  
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Multi Time Machines, Inc. respectfully 
requests that Amazon’s Petition for en banc rehearing be denied.   
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